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When an incumbent technology network faces a new entrant with superior capabilities, 
it may choose to announce a technology improvement as a preemption strategy to avoid 
forfeiting users. While the incumbent faces the dilemma of how much improvement it 
should commit to, users face the challenge of deciding how to divide resources (e.g., time 
spent) between the two networks. Using a two-period decision theoretic model, where 
users can be loyalists (who always prefer the incumbent) or switchers (ready to switch 
to the new entrant and back under suitable conditions), we show that in the presence of 
high switching costs, a low or high reputation leads the incumbent to a pure strategy of 
committing to a given level of improvement in technological capability. However, an 
incumbent with moderate reputation may not commit to any particular level of 
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I. Introduction 
Consumers with switching costs frequently face the dilemma of choosing to stay with their current 
technology provider or migrate to a competing firm1 with superior technology. Innovative firms often use 
preemption (e.g., the preannouncement2 of a future innovation) as a strategy to encourage existing 
consumers to wait for an improved technology, which adds to the complexity of the consumers‟ decision 
problem. In an era of rapid advances in technology, the incumbent firm faces the challenge of determining 
the cost of technological improvement it is ready to bear and the time of delivery of such an endeavor. In 
addition, the firm must ensure that the actual delivery of the innovation is in accordance with the 
preannouncement, since the inability to do so would hurt the firm‟s reputation, which, in turn, determines 
the certainty a consumer associates with the firm‟s ability to deliver the preannounced technology.  
Preemptive strategies are common amongst technology networks to secure market positions. In 2010, 
Apple entered the tablet computer market by announcing the launch of iPad, a revolutionary change in 
design and interface compared to tablet PC like HP Touch Smart that dominated the tablet PC market 
before Apple‟s entry. The incumbent HP reacted by preannouncing the release of Slate 500, a major leap 
in design over its existing tablets. However, this did not prevent consumers from adopting the iPad, which 
became the industry benchmark for tablet features and pricing. Was it prudent for HP to clearly commit 
to a future improvement in technology in the tablet market given its moderate reputation in this market? 
In early 2011, Apple announced its next innovation iPad 2 and delivered it in March of the same year. HP 
reacted with the preannouncement of HP Touch Pad. HP made it clear how it would match some of the 
key iPad capabilities, but remained uncommitted about many key features3. Was the relatively obscure 
preannouncement about Touch Pad the reason why many consumers were willing to wait for the release 
of Touch Pad before they made an adoption decision4? HP, however, could not deliver according to 
consumer expectations, leading to less-than-expected sales. In August 2011, HP discontinued the Touch 
Pad5 and other WebOS devices. While the complete reasoning behind HP‟s preemption strategy is not 
clear, the change in HP‟s strategy and its ability to preempt consumers raise the question regarding the 
role of reputation on preemption strategies in technology networks, where there are small time windows 
between new innovations. Is it possible that incumbents can formulate better preemption strategies by 
taking their reputation into account? 
The preemption literature discusses firm strategies for product pricing, preannouncement, timing and 
markets with or without network externalities (Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; Farrell, 1987; Farrell and 
Shapiro, 1988; Klemperer, 1987). Gerlach (2004) discusses the effect of announcement by a new entrant 
and the resulting reaction of the incumbent to preempt by cutting prices in a market where consumers 
have switching costs. In equilibrium, the new entrant does not always announce, and not announcing 
increases the ex-ante total welfare. Gerlach (2004) also shows that consumers can be better off with a ban 
on announcement. Choi et al. (2005) show that incentives for preannouncements are stronger in markets 
with network effects. In such markets preannouncements can be used to induce the delay of consumers' 
purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products' installed bases. The extant literature suggests that 
“vague” preannouncements may not have a strong influence on consumers and that information should 
be clear and informative. However, the literature also acknowledges that firms may not have an incentive 
to make clear preannouncements for the fear of product cannibalization, loss of reputation due to inability 
to deliver, and reaction from competition. The costs and benefits of preannouncement are different for 
consumers and firms, and these are less explored issues especially in a market where the new entrant 
arrives with a superior technology and where the incumbent‟s reputation influences its ability to 
successfully deliver a preannounced technology on time (Su and Rao, 2010). This paper attempts to 
bridge this gap by analyzing the effect of reputation on the committed or non-committal nature of a firm‟s 
preemption strategies.  
                                                          
1
 In this paper the terms firm and network are used interchangeably. 
2
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We model the case of two competing technology networks, where the product (network membership) is 
offered for free or are similarly priced. In such markets, consumers derive benefits primarily from (i) the 
innovation in technology provided by the network and (ii) network effects associated with the technology. 
Such markets are less prone to price competition and more inclined towards innovation related rivalry. 
The networks earn profits from partnering with service providers, advertisement or similar sources based 
on membership, which, in turn, derive value from network effects. However, product innovation and 
delivery are not costless. In addition, consumers incur costs in switching from one network to the other. 
In such a setting with positive network externalities and other switching costs, what level of technological 
capabilities should an incumbent firm announce in response to a new entrant with superior capabilities? 
What choices of membership do the consumers make when they are allowed to switch between networks 
by incurring a cost? Moreover, is it in the best interest of the incumbent to preannounce an uncertain 
future innovation (i.e., „commit‟) or should it not provide any clear indication about the level of innovation 
(i.e., ‘don’t commit’)? How does the reputation of the incumbent influence the preemption strategy? This 
research seeks to answer these questions that are relevant to the modern competitive landscape of 
technology networks.  
Ideally the incumbent should strive to induce high cost of switching to the new entrant, reduce the 
switching cost of consumers back from the new entrant, enhance reputation and bolster the proportion of 
loyalists in an attempt to keep the new entrant out of the market. However, this is not an easy endeavor. 
Thus, in most cases, the incumbent may have to share the market with the new entrant. Out of the feasible 
strategies of the incumbent, there can be a pure strategy (commit to a specific level of capability 
improvement) or a mixed strategy (don’t commit) equilibrium depending on the reputation of the firm 
and the switching cost involved in migrating from the incumbent to the new entrant and vice versa. If 
reputation is lower than a threshold, then an equilibrium is possible whereby the incumbent profits only 
from the „loyalists‟ whereas all „switchers‟ migrate to the new entrant. For moderate levels of reputation, 
the firms randomize their strategies and choose to keep the consumers guessing about the level of 
improvement by making vague preannouncements. Moreover, for high or low levels of reputation, the 
firms have a pure strategy equilibrium whereby the incumbent can preannounce and commit to a certain 
level of improvement to consumers.  
This research combines factors specific to firms (reputation), consumers (switching costs, loyalty), 
industry (network effects) and innovation (level of innovation, profitability) in order to use 
preannouncement as a preemption strategy (Su and Rao, 2010). The incumbent firm should realize that 
for reputation to influence a firm‟s profits, it must innovate in the cost effective production of desired 
technological capability before using a preemptive strategy. Firms should also understand the benefits of 
controlling the switching costs borne by the consumers and its effect on firm strategies.  
While the extant literature has explored how reputation may affect the timing of a firm‟s 
preannouncement, it is not clear how firms with disparate levels of reputation should preempt in highly 
competitive technology markets with network effects and other switching costs, where there are short 
durations between successive innovations. The key contribution of this research is to demonstrate the role 
of reputation on the level of commitment to future technological improvements in such markets. Our 
works contributes to the reputation and preemption literature by demonstrating that while a low 
reputation incumbent will engage in a competition involving small technological improvements (the 
battle of the minnows), a high reputation incumbent will compete with large improvements in technology 
(the battle of the giants). However, incumbent with moderate reputation may find it beneficial not to 
clearly signal its future innovation (sit on the fence). 
II. The Model  
A two-period model is used to represent the dynamics in a market of two competing networks. Network A 
is the incumbent with capability ( 0)C  , and network B enters the market in period 0 with superior 
capability C  , 0  . T represents the intensity of network effects when all consumers are on one 
network. Initially all consumers are on network A. To focus on network effects and switching costs, we 
assume no new consumers arrive while the existing consumers do not leave the market.  
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A proportion  of the consumers are loyalists (Gerlach 2004) and will never switch to the new entrant. 
The remaining proportion 1  represents switchers, who are similar in characteristics and decision 
making and who may switch between networks under suitable conditions. 
ABS and BAS represent the 
switching cost of consumers (switchers) when they switch from network A to B and B to A respectively. 
This model does not capture any additional heterogeneity, i.e., all switchers may switch or stay back with 
the incumbent. All consumers have the same discount factor  . The decision tree of a switcher is shown 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Decision of a switcher across time. 
Upon the entry of new network B, the incumbent A preannounces an improved capability C   to be 
delivered in period 1, where 0  . The consumers believe that network A will deliver the preannounced 
technology with a probability  , and fail to do so with ( 1  ). Consumers receive services (or 
membership) for free, and the network (or firm) generates revenues from a single partner (on the other 
side of the market) that has a fixed budget pT in each period for the entire population and values all 
consumers equally. That is, the partner is willing to pay a fixed price p per consumer irrespective of the 
network size. Due to a single partner, there are no bidding mechanisms on the partner side of the market 
that may lead to differential pricing in this model. Content based networks are known to charge a fixed 
price for pay-per-click advertisements.  
 
While , , , ,AB BAC T S S are exogenously specified,   and 
' are endogenous in regions specified by a 
range of  . The reputation of a firm is positively correlated with the probability of successful delivery  . 
Therefore, regions specified by  can be mapped on to a region specified by the firm‟s reputation. The 
probability of successful delivery may depend on the extent of undertaking by the incumbent, and this 
effect is captured in regions specified by  . A simple fixed price revenue model on the partner‟s side of 
the market helps us isolate the effect of probability of success (and therefore reputation) on preemption 
strategies. We do not focus on “vaporware” announcements, i.e., strategic false announcements made by 
the firm to deter entry by a competitor or migration of consumers. Rather the focus is on credible 
announcements, where the incumbent makes an honest effort to deliver the improvement, and where the 
chance of success is given by  .  
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1 2 3 4, , ,    represent a switcher‟s choice of network A or B in period 0 and 1 (see 
Figure 1). 1 and 2 represent the actions of the switcher (1 represents the choice of network A and 0 
represents the choice of network B) on success and failure of the incumbent to deliver the preannounced 
improvement in period 1, if the switcher chooses to stay back with the incumbent network A in period 0. 
Similarly, 3 and 4 represent the actions of a switcher in period 1 if she chooses to switch to the new 
entrant in period 1.  For example, 
1 2 3 4, , , {1,0,0,1}     indicates that in period 1, a switcher will 
choose network A if the preannounced technology is delivered and network B if the preannounced 
technology is not delivered, if network A is chosen in period 0 . It also suggests that in period 1 the 
switcher will choose network A if the preannounced technology is delivered and network B if 
preannounced technology is not delivered, if network B is chosen in period 0 . The switcher derives an 
expected utility of
AEU or BEU across two periods by choosing network A or B in period 0 respectively.  
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1 1  if ABT S    , 2 1  if ABT S   , 3 1  if BAT S    , 4 1  if BAT S   (0.3) 
There are sixteen possible combinations of 
1 2 3 4, , ,    (strategies of a switcher in period 1). However, 
not all combinations of 
1 2 3 4, , ,    are feasible. Regions are denoted by endogenous values of  and  . 
Computing the equilibrium regions of operation is a two-step process. First the regions are found under 
which consumers would participate. Second given these feasible regions where consumers shall 
participate, we focus on those regions where the firm will operate given its profit maximizing problem and 
hence find the equilibrium regions in which the consumer will eventually operate. Table 1 and Table 2 
show the infeasible and feasible combinations respectively. For a given , , , , ,AB BAT S S   from Table 1, 
a switcher‟s strategy depends on the expected utilities from starting in network A or network B. The 
decision rule for period 0  is summarized in Table 2. Operating regions are defined by the technology 
provided by the new entrant and that preannounced by the incumbent in period 0 to induce the consumer 
to choose a strategy set denoted by
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Table 1: Infeasible consumer strategies. 
1  2  3  4  
Comment 
0 0 0 1 If a switcher chooses to migrate from A to B in period 0 
by incurring the switching cost, then she has no 
incentive to migrate back to A by incurring switching 
costs again, if the promised improvement is not 
delivered.   
0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 This combination of decisions is not feasible because if 
a switcher has an incentive to switch to B in spite of 
delivery of technology by A, then there is no reason why 
she should stay with A if the improvement is not 
delivered. 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 If a switcher has an incentive to migrate from B to A in 
period 1 on delivery of committed improvement by the 
incumbent, she has no incentive to switch from A to B 
in period 1. 
1 1 1 1 If the switcher has an incentive to return to A 
irrespective of delivery of committed improvement, 
s/he has no incentive to switch from A to B in period 1. 
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A switcher always chooses network B.  
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A switcher chooses network A (Region V A) 
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else chooses network B (Region V B). 
V 
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Each region has a strategy set 1 2 3 4( , , , )    ,  and 
' specified by exogenous parameters , , , ABT S 
and BAS . Each region is divided into sub-regions (e.g., IA, IB, IIA, IIB, IIIA, IIIB, IVA, IVB, VA, and VB). 
IA, IIA, IIIA, IVA and VA denote the sub-regions of operation characterized by switcher strategy 1 2,  , 
and
' . Similarly, IB, IIB, IIIB, IVB and VB denote the sub-regions of operation characterized by switcher 
strategy 3 4,  ,  and
' . Later in the paper we show that under certain conditions, regions III, IV or V 
may be the dominant sub-regions of operation, i.e., networks operate in the region and consumers also 
have an incentive to participate. 
Operating region IIIA is highlighted by 
' being sufficiently high to make switchers stay back with the 
incumbent on successful delivery, while  is not large enough to cover the current period loss of network 
effects from loyalists, switching cost from A to B in period 0 , and B to A in period 1 on successful delivery 
of the preannounced technology. However,  is large enough for switchers to migrate to B if the 
incumbent fails to deliver. Similarly, operating region IIIB is marked by   high enough for switchers to 
balance the loss in network effects from loyalists, switching cost from A to B in period 0 offset by the 
benefit of not bearing the switching cost to B if the incumbent A does not deliver. In this region, 
' is not 
large enough to induce switchers to stay back with the incumbent in period 0, though it is high enough to 
balance the cost of switching from the new entrant back to the incumbent on successful delivery of the 
preannounced technology. 
The networks operate in IVB when the preannounced technology 
' is not high enough to keep the 
switchers from staying back with the incumbent but the technology delivered by the new entrant   is 
sufficient to cover the loss of network effects from the loyalist base, the cost of switching to the new 
entrant in period 0 and the benefit from technology that the switcher might have had if she returned to 
the incumbent on successful delivery of the preannounced capability. The networks operate in VB if 
preannounced technology 
' is not sufficiently large to induce the switcher to stay back with the 
incumbent in period 0, but large enough to cover the switching cost incurred by the consumer when they 
return to the new entrant on successful delivery of 
' in period 1. However,  is sufficiently large for 
switchers to have an incentive not to go back to the incumbent network if it fails to deliver the 
preannounced technology. 
Table 3: Expected network effects in feasible sub regions.
 
Region ANE  BNE  
IB 2 T   2 1 T  
IIB 2 T   2 1 T  
III A      1 1 T        1 1 T    
III B   1 T           1 1 1T T       
IV A 2T  0  
IV B 2 T   2 1 T  
VA 2T  0  
V B   1 T           1 1 1T T       
 
Relatively speaking, sub-regions IIIA and IIIB have high technological capabilities provided by the 
incumbent and the new entrant, while sub-regions IVB and VB are characterized by low capabilities 
provided by both the networks. The incumbent must preannounce a higher technology in VB as compared 
to IVB and the new entrant must deliver a higher technology in IIIB as compared IIIA. Table 3 shows the 
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expected total network effects 
ANE and BNE (across the two periods) on the incumbent and the new 
entrants, respectively, for different feasible regions.  
The revenues earned by the networks are considered to be increasing in network effects. The profit 
functions of network A is given by    A A A ANE p C     where ANE  is the total network effect in 
period 0 and 1 on network A, Ap  is the price per consumer that the partner of the online network pay and 
the partner values every consumer equally, A is the unit cost of developing capabilities on network A.  
Similarly, Network B‟s profit function is given by    B B B BNE p C     . Table 4 shows the 
maximum profits for the two networks for different regions.  
 
Table 4: Maximum profit of network A and B for feasible regions 
                                                   
Region 
Maximum A  Maximum B  
Comments 
I 2 A ATP C      2 1 B B ABTP C T S       BAS T
 
II  2 A A ABTP C T S         2 1 B B ABTP C T S       BAS T
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If BAS T  , i.e., if the switching cost faced by a switcher to return to network A is greater than the 
benefit derived from the network effect of the loyalists, network A prefers region I to II, while network B is 
indifferent between these two regions. Therefore, region II can be ruled out as a contender for the 
operating region. Further, network B will stay out of the market and never operate in regions IVA and VA 
because it suffers a loss in these regions, while network A prefers IVA to VA. Thus, if network A operates 
in IVA, network B stays out of the market. However, network A operates in IVA (i.e., all consumers 






    
 
 (from Table 2). This condition is met with 
high switching cost from A to B, high reputation and proportion of loyalists. If the above condition is not 
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met, then network A would consider IVB and VB as possible contenders for the operating region. In 
region IVB, the switchers choose to switch to network B and never return, while in region V, the switchers 
switch to network B in period 0, but switch back to network A if the preannounced technology is 
delivered. However, network A is indifferent between regions IB and IVB, whereas network B prefers IVB 
to IB, thus ruling out region I. While Network A prefers to operate in sub region VB, network B prefers 
IVB.  
Proposition 1: An incumbent with low or high levels of reputation commits to a given level of 
improvement in capability in its preannouncement. An incumbent with moderate level of reputation will 
not commit to any specific improvement.  
When the reputation of the incumbent is low, i.e. if th  , IVB or VB is the strategic choice of operation 







. This suggests that when ABS forms the minor part of the total 
switching cost, it becomes relatively easier for switchers to migrate to B in period 0 and operate in region 
IVB or VB. If 
' ( )BAT S    , i.e., the incumbent is not able to preannounce a capability that can 
match the improvement in the new entrant‟s capability over the network effect provided by the loyalist 
base and switching cost to switch back to network A, IVB (switchers migrate to the new entrant) is the 
equilibrium region of operation. However, if the incumbent can generate a higher technology, i.e., 
' ( )BAT S    , VB is the equilibrium region of operation. For example, if switching costs across 
networks are identical and IVB is the region of operation, network A would prefer to announce no 
improvement in technology if the probability of delivery is less than 0.5. In this case, the incumbent 
profits purely from the loyalists.  
If reputation of the incumbent such that th  indicating a high probability of delivery (for example, in 
case of similar switching costs 0.5  ) and also implying that switching cost from A to B is the major 
part of the total switching cost, then there are three final contenders for the operating region, namely IIIA, 
IIIB and IVB. While network B prefers region IVB to IIIB to IIIA, network A prefers IIIA to IIIB. Network 







otherwise network A 
prefers IIIA. Similarly, network A prefers IVB to IIIB if 
  













. Thus, unless 
operating in IVB is the dominant strategy, the networks do not have any pure strategies and would play a 
mixed strategy between regions IIIA, IIIB and IVB for incumbent firms with moderate reputation. 
It should be noted that to focus on the effect of reputation on preemption strategy, the price charged per 
consumer by both network to their advertisers have been considered to be equal, i.e., A Bp p p  . This 
assumption has been made to make the analysis tractable and isolate the effect of price competition on the 
other side of the market (i.e. partner) from innovation for the consumer side. Moreover, to observe the 
effect of reputation alone, the cost per unit improvement in capability has been considered to be the same 
for both networks ( A B    ), i.e., networks do not have a competitive advantage over each other in 
building the improvement. This may be true in many cases today, where the production of Information 
Technology (IT) based technological improvements has been standardized and resources in the form of 
programmers, analysts and architects are not scarce. These assumptions are relaxed in the later part of 
the analysis. 
Thus, we find that the incumbent firm would commit (preannounce an upcoming improvement) or not 
commit (obscure the ex-post improvement by not giving any clear signal) depending on its reputation. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of reputation on the incumbent‟s strategies. While the incumbent firm with 
low or high reputation will commit to operating in region IVB/VB or IIIA/IIIB respectively, an incumbent 
with medium levels of reputation will prefer not to commit to any one strategy and would rather have a 
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Battle of the Giants 
Pure Strategy Equilibrium 
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Operating region: IIIA or IIIB 
Battle of the Minnows 
Pure Strategy Equilibrium 
Low technological capability 
Operating region: IVB or VB 
 
mixed strategy equilibrium. Firms with medium reputation will thus engage in "vague” preannouncement 
strategies (Su and Rao 2010). Thus when region IIIA or IIIB is a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., when 
switchers start from A or B respectively, but always end up with network A on success and network B on 
failure to deliver the preannounced technology, we call the incumbent‟s reaction to the new entrant as a 
‘battle of the giants’ where a highly reputed incumbent network engages in a high technology battle to 
secure its market positions.  
For example, in 2008, Roku pioneered the streaming player and allowed consumers to stream content 
from Netflix. With the only streaming player that had a partnership with Netflix, Roku built a high 
reputation in this market. In the same year, Apple TV entered the market (similarly priced as Roku) and 
allowed its consumers to stream content from iTunes, MobileMe and Flickr. While some of the streaming 
services offered by Roku and Apple TV are free, consumers have to pay a monthly subscription fee for 
others. It became clear that consumers wanted to adopt the player that could give them more streaming 
services options. When Apple TV added Netflix to its service providers, Roku preempted its customers 
from switching by preannouncing the addition of services like Amazon VOD, Hulu Plus and Pandora. The 
high reputation incumbent Roku (synonymous to a giant in this case) was successful in forestalling a 











Figure 2: Effect of reputation of the incumbent network on the operating region. 
Similarly, when the technological improvements provided by the new entrant and the preannouncement 
by the incumbent are low, a low reputation incumbent engages the new entrant in a ‘battle of the 
minnows’ where a switcher always switches to the new entrant in period 0 and never returns (IVB), 
forcing the incumbent to profit only from the loyalists, or returns only on successful delivery of 
preannounced technology (VB).  
For moderate levels of reputation, the incumbent and the new entrant do not have pure strategy 
equilibrium, and therefore the incumbent‟s preannouncement may not commit to any specific technology. 
Rather the incumbent network would prefer to „sit on the fence‟, make obscure preannouncements and 
keep the consumers guessing about its future strategies. Not committing would mean that the networks 
do not have pure strategy equilibrium i.e. it has more than one feasible region of operations and will play 
a mixed strategy (Nash equilibrium refinement concept like the trembling hand perfection can be used). 
Randomizing over different strategies means they could play any of the feasible strategies and are not 
committing to any one strategy in particular. Thus, consumers may not assume that 0  . Under such a 
scenario, consumer‟s dilemma is deepened by vague preannouncements made by the incumbent. Thus, 
consumers can either choose to wait or take a leap of faith. The effect of „sitting on the fence‟ may delay 
consumers from switching to the new entrant who may want to take a decision only after the incumbent‟s 
technology is delivered in period 2.  
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As discussed before, such a strategy may have been taken by HP with Touch Pad in its competition against 
Apple‟s iPad2. Twitter‟s strategy could be another example. By 2009, Twitter had built moderate levels of 
reputation in the market of micro blogging and social networking service. However, Twitter protocols 
could be used by other micro blogging or social networking service providers to create mash-ups6 or 
Twitter like applications. Thus, Twitter was directly competing with other networks providing Twitter 
based applications. In late 2009, Twitter made an announcement about increasing its capabilities by 
joining hands with YCombinator led Twitter projects (Justin.Tv, Scribd, Dropbox) by giving them a better 
access to tweet7 streams. The announcements did not clarify what level of access was going to be granted 
to YCombinator led companies and how this would affect other companies using the Twitter protocol. 
Twitter‟s vague announcement can be seen as a signal its consumers to use applications developed by 
YCombinator led companies to get reliable and uninterrupted service. This may be Twitter‟s strategy of 
getting a share of the mash-up market which was generating revenue based on the Twitter protocol 
without sharing profits with Twitter. Moreover, this non-committal nature of Twitter has also left other 
consumer of the Twitter protocol (mash-up development firms) in a dilemma about their future strategies 
of building Twitter based mash-up applications. 
                                                              
Proposition 2a: For a large improvement in technology over the incumbent, reputation has a positive 
influence on profits of the incumbent in a ‘battle of the giants’ only if the ratio of investment per unit 
improvement in capability to total revenue generated from switchers is low; otherwise reputation 
influences profits negatively.                 
 
For incumbents with high reputation (as shown in Table 5), the profit increases with reputation when 
operating in sub-region IIIA. In this sub-region a switcher begins with network A in period 0 and remains 
on A if preannounced capability is delivered by the incumbent, and switches to B otherwise. Thus, a high 
reputation has a positive effect on profits of the incumbent in this sub-region. However, in IIIA, the new 
entrant‟s profit decreases with increase in reputation.  In sub region IIIB, the switchers start with B and 
move back to A only if the preannounced capability is delivered. In this case, since the switcher chooses 
the new entrant in period 0, the reputation plays a role to influence these switchers to come back to the 
incumbent in period 1 on successful delivery of committed improvement. In such a scenario, it is crucial 
for the incumbent to keep low its ratio of investment made to the total revenue generated from switchers 
(proof provided in the Appendix). If it is able to do so, then the incumbent can increase its profits when its 
reputation increases. However, if the investments made are not cost effective then increase in reputation 
hurts the incumbent. Furthermore, in IIIB the new entrant‟s profit decreases with increase in reputation. 
 
Table 5: Effect of increase in reputation of the incumbent on consumer welfare and network 










New-Entrant Technology New-Entrant 
Technology 
High Low High Low High Low 
  Increases if technology 
production is cost effective. 




                                                          
6
 Mash-up is a term used in web development to characterize a web page or application that combines services 
from different sources to create a new service. 
7
 Tweet is a post or an update in status on Twitter which is a micro blogging service. 
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Proposition 2b: For a high preannounced improvement in technology, reputation has a positive 
influence on profits of the incumbent in a ‘battle of the minnows’ only if the ratio of investment per unit 
improvement in capability to the total revenue generated from switchers is low; otherwise reputation 
influences profits negatively.                 
 
For incumbents with low reputation (as shown in Table 6) profits of the networks are not influenced by 
reputation, when operating in sub-region IVB. In this sub-region a switcher begins with B in period 0 and 
remains on B in period 1.  However, in sub-region VB, a switchers start with B and migrate back to A only 
if the preannounced capability is delivered. In this case, since the switcher chooses the new entrant in 
period 0, reputation plays a role to influence these switchers to come back to the incumbent in period 1 on 
successful delivery of the committed improvement. In such a scenario, it is crucial for the incumbent to 
keep low its ratio of investment made to the total revenue generated from switchers (proof provided in 
Appendix). If it is able to do so, then the incumbent can increase its profits when its reputation increases. 
However, if the investments made are not cost effective then increase in reputation hurts the incumbent. 
 
Table 6: Effect of increase in reputation of the incumbent on the total consumer welfare and 










Preannounced Technology Preannounced 
Technology 
High Low High Low High Low 
 No 
Effect 
Increases if technology 






Given a sub-region of operation (a given reputation), the total consumer welfare and profits of the firm 
may vary with switching costs. For a given sub-region (strategy set of consumers, improvement delivered 
by new entrant and improvement preannounced by the incumbent), the total consumer welfare is given 
by the sum of the expected utilities of the loyalists and switchers.  
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Proposition 3: In a ‘Battle of the Giants’, if the new entrant delivers a high improvement in technology 
and switching costs ABS  and BAS are high and low respectively, the total consumer welfare is lower than 
what it would be if ABS  and BAS are low and high respectively. 
If the new entrant delivers a high improvement in technology, it is more likely that switchers will migrate 
to the new entrant network B in period 0  while loyalists always stay with the incumbent. Therefore, the 
switching cost from A to B, ABS must be incurred by switchers in period 0  to induce the switchers in this 
sub region. Since in the „battle of the giants‟ a switcher chooses the incumbent if the committed 
improvement in technology is delivered, she must incur BAS in order to switch back to the incumbent if the 
preannounced improvement in technology is delivered. This suggests that consumers would prefer a high 
ABS and low BAS  in this sub-region (see Table 7). However, it should be noted that while the incumbent 
would prefer a high ABS and BAS , the new entrant would prefer a low switching costs (see Table 7). It may 
be observed that if the incumbent could induce ABS (incumbent prefers high switching cost) and the new 
entrant could induce BAS (new entrant prefers low switching cost), the total welfare of the consumer will 
be high because in terms of switching costs, the interests of the incumbent and the new entrant will be 
aligned with the consumers.  







































Proposition 4: In a ‘Battle of the Minnows’ when the incumbent preannounces a large improvement in 
technology, for a given BAS , a high ABS  leads to high welfare for the consumers but low profit for the 
networks,  while a low ABS  leads to low welfare for the consumers but high profit for the networks. 
From Table 8, we note that when a low reputation incumbent preannounces a high improvement in 
technology, consumers may feel that it is more likely to fail given its low reputation. Therefore, a switcher 
expects to migrate to B in period 0 and then migrate to A only if the delivery of the preannounced 
technology is successful. However, the new entrant in this sub-region also delivers a high improvement in 
technology and must motivate a switcher to migrate to the new entrant in period 0 . Thus, the higher the 
switching cost, the higher the technology delivered by the new entrant, safeguarding the switcher in case 
the incumbent fails to deliver in period 1. Both the networks generate low profits in order to balance 
switching costs. 
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III. Conclusion 
In technology networks with switching costs, incumbent networks often use preemption strategies like the 
preannouncement of future technologies in order to dissuade consumers from migrating to the new 
entrant with superior technology. However, not all preemption strategies succeed. This paper explores the 
role of reputation of the incumbent on preemption strategies. Our results show that in order to preempt 
consumers from migrating permanently, an incumbent with high reputation should make clear 
preannouncements, committing to a considerable future improvement in technology when the new 
entrant offers a high improvement over the status quo. We call this high technology competition between 
two networks as the „battle of the giants‟. A similar strategy is advisable for incumbent with low 
reputation. In a „battle of the minnows‟ between two low technology networks, the incumbent is better of 
giving clear signals of it future improvements in technology. However, an incumbent with moderate 
reputation should engage the market with vague announcements and not commit to any specific 
improvements in technology (sit on the fence). The implication of vague preannouncements could be that 
the incumbent informs the market with incremental disclosure of its improvement as the delivery date 
comes closer or devise a marketing campaign with teaser advertisements. Further, while the reputation of 
the incumbent may help justify the preemption strategy, the profit of the firm is dependent on its ability 
to deliver technology in a cost effective manner. Our study also shows that consumer welfare may be 
adversely affected depending on the switching cost and preemption strategy of the incumbent for its 
reputation of delivering the preannounced technology.  
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 2a: 
When the high reputation incumbent engages the new entrant in a „battle of the giants‟ in region IIIB, the 

















. If the ratio of the cost per unit improvement in technology to 
the total revenue generated from the switcher is less than a threshold determined by discounted total 
switching costs then the reputation influences the profit of the incumbent positively. Otherwise, the profit 
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of the firm suffers due to increase in reputation in this region, because technology is not produced in a 
cost effective manner. 
 
Proof of proposition 2b: 
When the low reputation incumbent engages the new entrant in a „battle of the minnows‟ in region VB, the 
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. If the ratio of the cost per unit improvement in 
technology to the total revenue generated from the switcher is less than a threshold determined by 
discounted switching costs then the reputation influences the profit of the incumbent positively. 
Otherwise, profit of the firm suffers due to increase in reputation in this region, because technology is not 
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